UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1996/204
18 March 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit annexed hereto a letter dated 17 March 1996 addressed to you by Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq, giving details of the facts relating to the inspection operations conducted by Special Commission inspection team UNSCOM 143.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Permanent Representative

96-06492 (E) 180396 180396 190396

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Annex

Letter dated 17 March 1996 from the Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

I should like to clarify to you and to the members of the Security Council the facts concerning the inspections carried out by UNSCOM 143 during the period 7 to 17 March 1996 and the information relating thereto conveyed to the Council by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission in his letter dated 9 March 1996 (document S/1996/182), a copy of which you made available to our Permanent Representative.

First:

1. Inspection operations commenced in accordance with the provisions of resolution 687 (1991) in May 1991, and have continued until the present time. During that period, inspection teams requested access to the headquarters of any ministry on only two occasions. The first was in 1992, when an inspection team requested access to the headquarters of the Ministry of Agriculture, leading to a long controversy between the Iraqi authorities and the Special Commission. That controversy was settled by an agreement between me and the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission on an appropriate arrangement for entering the Ministry headquarters. Upon entering, the representatives of the Special Commission did not find any of the items they alleged to be there.

The second incident was the one which took place on 8 March 1996, when the chief inspector of UNSCOM 143 requested access to the Ministry of Irrigation. After a discussion lasting several hours between our representatives and the Vice-Chairman of the Special Commission, who was in Baghdad at the time, I telephoned the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, Mr. Rolf Ekeus, and we reached agreement on an appropriate arrangement for entering the building. Once again the team did not find what it had alleged to have been in the building (missiles, missile components and large boxes of documents).

2. On 11 March 1996 the same inspection team requested access to the headquarters of an institute for training the Republican Guards. In this case, I also telephoned Mr. Ekeus, who was then in London, and agreed with him on an appropriate arrangement for entering the building. The inspection team entered the building, and did not find any of the materials alleged to be there.

3. On 14 March 1996 the same inspection team asked to visit one of the headquarters of the Special Guards. An appropriate arrangement for entering the building was agreed upon between the Iraqi officials concerned and the chief inspector. The same thing happened on 15 March 1996 when the chief inspector requested entry to a site belonging to the Republic Guards. After entering these two sites, the team did not find any of the materials it alleged to be there.

4. During the said period the inspection team, in addition to the aforementioned headquarters, visited nine other sites without any problem.

Second:

It is clear from what is indicated above that the delays which occurred before the aforementioned four inspection operations took place were due to the fact that the headquarters which the inspection team asked to inspect were of a special nature (such as a ministry and the headquarters of establishments that have special characteristics relating to national security).

It is worth mentioning that since the incident at the Ministry of Agriculture in 1992, 104 inspection teams have discharged their tasks without requesting access to any headquarters or establishment of a nature similar to that of the headquarters which the last chief inspector requested to enter, a matter which caused us both surprise and concern.

In July 1993, during Mr. Ekeus' visit to Baghdad, we reached an agreement under which the inspection teams should, while discharging their tasks under the provisions of resolution 687 (1991), respect Iraq's sovereignty, dignity and national security. This was confirmed in paragraph 16 of the joint report of the two sides dated 30 November 1993 (document S/26825), which stated as follows:

> "As regards Iraq's concerns relating to respect for the sovereignty, internal security and dignity of the people and the State of Iraq and Iraq's right to industrial, scientific and technological progress and development in all fields not covered by the prohibitions contained in resolution 687 (1991), the Commission and IAEA stressed that it was their intention to implement the plans in the least intrusive manner consistent with effective monitoring and verification in the circumstances prevailing, with all due regard to the legitimate concerns of Iraq noted above, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."

Third:

The other reasons for the delay in permitting access to the four sites were:

1. The Iraqi side was surprised by the request to inspect the sites, which has for many years been without precedent. This required contacts among the concerned officials to study these requests with a view to taking the appropriate position thereon.

2. The request to enter the headquarters of the Ministry of Irrigation was made at 9 p.m. on Friday, 8 March 1996, which was a weekend. Similarly, the request to enter the headquarters of the Republican Guards was presented on Friday, 15 March 1996. To conduct inspections on a weekend would certainly lead to delay in contacting the officials concerned (as mentioned in paragraph 1) for them to return to their offices to study the situation in order to deal with it.

3. Entry into any site which an inspection team requests requires the presence of the official in charge of the site and a suitable number of personnel in order to answer the questions of the inspection team, to provide the keys of rooms, lockers and stores and to meet other requirements which would enable the

inspection team to carry out the inspection. All this requires time, particularly when the inspection activities are carried out during weekends or after working hours.

4. Discussion between the Iraqi side and the chief inspector with a view to reaching an appropriate arrangement for entering a building and carrying out the inspection operation without touching upon matters that do not relate to the duties and tasks of the Special Commission takes time, particularly when some sites are very large and contain many facilities of different kinds. The chief inspector also needs time to contact his principals in order to secure their approval of the arrangement reached with the Iraqi side.

5. Taking into consideration all these practical factors relating to ensuring the efficiency of the inspection, the delays which occurred and which have been referred to in the letter of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission were no longer than the time necessitated by these practical factors; in addition I twice contacted Mr. Ekeus, by telephone, on one occasion in London, in order to reach an understanding on the basis of the Special Commission's undertakings with respect to Iraq's sovereignty, dignity and national security and of Iraq's obligations under the relevant resolutions.

Fourth:

The allegation that the delay in granting access to the said headquarters raises doubts as to whether materials alleged to have been therein might have been removed or disposed of is refuted by the following facts:

1. Normally, the requests of the inspection teams are, as in the aforementioned cases, for no-notice inspection, i.e. the team reaches the site it seeks to inspect without advance notice.

2. Once the inspection team arrives at the designated site, the inspectors surround the site from all directions.

3. The inspection team which carried out the recent inspections consisted of more than 50 members with 16 vehicles, a number quite sufficient to surround the building from all directions and to control its entrances and exits.

4. At the same time that the inspection team arrives at a site, the helicopters of the Special Commission start flying over the site to ensure that nothing is moved out of the site.

5. The helicopters photograph the site before, during and after the inspection. It is possible, by comparing the photographs, to ascertain whether any large equipment may have been moved by trucks corresponding to the size and weight of such equipment. This was particularly so in the case of the last inspection team which was searching, as it informed us, for missiles, missile components, missile launchers and large boxes of documents. During the recent inspections, helicopter overflight of the site was interrupted briefly on two occasions (for 20-30 minutes) for reasons of fuel shortage, which logically does not allow any major change in the status of the site.

6. It is very easy for the inspection teams to verify whether some documents were burned.

For these practical and technical reasons, the allegations that there was a probability of a change in the status of the site, or of the removal of some equipment from it and the burning of some documents, are not realistic.

Fifth:

Jumping to the conclusion that what happened in the last few days constitutes a pattern of impeding the work of the Special Commission is quite wrong and baseless.

In the name of the Government of Iraq, I reaffirm that the Iraqi authorities have no intention of impeding the tasks of the Special Commission in Iraq. On the contrary, we have affirmed on the highest levels that we are keen to continue the relations of understanding and joint work with a view to fulfilling the tasks of the Special Commission as soon as possible. This has been confirmed by all the recent reports of the Special Commission. As I reiterate this affirmation, I expect the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission and its representatives, while discharging their duties in Iraq, to adhere to their undertakings towards Iraq by respecting Iraq's sovereignty, dignity and national security. I also expect the Security Council to deal with this issue in an objective manner which would balance Iraq's obligations towards the Security Council and the Council's obligations towards Iraq in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the Council.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/205
19 March 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1996 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In accordance with instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 14 March 1996 from the "Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations", addressed to you (S/1996/189).

The press release annexed to that letter does not reflect accurately the substance of the meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and contains some wording and conclusions that are not acceptable to the Croatian Government. In particular, my Government should like to emphasize that the parties were not engaged in any discussions pertaining to an exit to the sea for the Bosnian Serb entity. The press release was prepared by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and inadvertently circulated to the media in Zagreb prior to the bilateral meeting on 11 March 1996, according to the explanation provided to the Croatian delegation by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The delegation of the Republic of Croatia declined discussions on the said press release. Therefore, the press release should not be viewed as a joint document. Moreover, since the said meeting ended with a joint press conference by the two Foreign Ministers, my Government can only conclude that this press release was circulated to the members of the Security Council in error.

My Government considers the transcript of the joint press conference, and the signed "Minutes" between the two Governments as the only relevant documents of the Zagreb bilateral meeting.

I should like to request your kind assistance in circulating the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladimir DROBNJAK
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/206
19 March 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 19 March 1996 addressed to you by Mr. Mohammed Said al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the violations committed by the U-2 aircraft.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-06713 (E) 190396 190306 200396

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Annex

Letter dated 19 March 1996 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

We wish to refer to our letters, of which the most recent is the letter dated 11 January 1996 (document S/1996/26) addressed to the President of the Security Council, concerning the violation of Iraqi airspace by the United States U-2 spy plane on the pretext of conducting an aerial survey for the Special Commission.

We should like to inform you that this aircraft, which always takes off from Saudi Arabian territory, has continued its violations and breaches of Iraqi airspace, infringing thereby our country's sovereignty and security. As of the end of February 1996 it had made 287 overflights, for a total flight time of 1,302 hours, since it began such operations in August 1991.

In my previous letters, I deduced a certain amount of logical evidence that has become apparent since the use of this aircraft started, clearly indicating that its repeated utilization is designed only to serve the policy of the State to which the aircraft belongs. I would mention in this connection the explicit admission by the United States Defense Secretary, Mr. William Perry, who on 6 February 1996 stated in an address to the Institute for Near East Political Studies in Washington that his country was indeed involved in operations designed to expose my country to dangers and plots with a view to changing its political regime. We may assert that among the important means employed by the United States of America with a view to attaining the objective referred to by Secretary of Defense Perry are the overflights by the U-2 aircraft and the military information it compiles on my country. Consequently, it is incumbent upon the United Nations to re-examine the issue of continued forcible use of this aircraft by the United States of America to violate Iraq's airspace in a manner totally incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as they relate to respect for the sovereignty of all Member States. We condemn these unjustified violations of our airspace and demand that an end be put to these illegal operations. Iraq reserves the right to demand redress for the material and psychological damage caused by the violations of its airspace by this aircraft.

I also take this opportunity to reiterate the request, made in our 106 letters on this subject to the Secretary-General to date, that Iraqi aircraft should be used instead of foreign aircraft in the work of the Special Commission in order to exclude any possibility of such foreign aircraft being used for purposes prejudicial to Iraq's sovereignty and security.

I request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/207
19 March 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the violations of Iraqi national airspace committed by the air forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France in order to carry out reconnaissance and cause provocation continued over the period from 1 to 15 March 1996, as indicated below.

1. Northern region: 147 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres over Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Agrah, Amadiyah and Sarsank.

2. Southern region: 759 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Artawi, Busayyah, Qurnah, Chabaish, Ushbayjah, Qal'at Salih, Basra, Salman, Amarah, Hamzah, Shanafiyah and Lasaf.

3. Thirteen sorties by United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres which violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region before leaving in the direction of Kuwait.

I request you to intercede with the above-mentioned States in order that they should cease these activities, which threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq and constitute flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law.

These acts continue to terrorize civilians and to cause material damage to personal property and public facilities. The Republic of Iraq reiterates its right to call for payment of legal redress for the damage caused to the Iraqi people.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/51/79
S/1996/208
21 March 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Item 41 of the preliminary list*
SUPPORT BY THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
OF THE EFFORTS OF GOVERNMENTS TO
PROMOTE AND CONSOLIDATE NEW OR
RESTORED DEMOCRACIES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 20 March 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine issued on 15 March 1996 concerning the adoption of the resolution of the State Duma of the Russian Federation dated 15 March 1996 on the closer integration of the peoples which had united into the USSR and the repeal of the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Soviet Republic of 12 December 1991 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 41 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Anatoli M. ZLENKO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Ukraine
to the United Nations

* A/51/50.

ANNEX

[Original: Russian]

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the adoption of the resolution of the State Duma of the Russian Federation dated 15 March 1996 on the closer integration of the peoples which had united to form the USSR and the repeal of the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of 12 December 1991

On 15 March 1996, the State Duma of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution on the closer integration of the peoples which had united to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the repeal of the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of 12 December 1991. The Supreme Soviet's resolution of 12 December 1991 denounced the Treaty on the formation of the USSR.

In this connection, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is authorized to state the following.

In Ukraine, the adoption of this resolution by the State Duma of the Russian Federation is regarded as an attempt by certain political circles in the Russian Federation to reactivate the former USSR. The hopes of reviving the former unified federative State are without any legal basis, including in international law, and do not reflect the realities of the political situation that has emerged today both in the development of the independent countries that have been formed on the territory of the former USSR and in the development of the Commonwealth of Independent States as a whole. Ukraine condemns such actions as constituting a threat to the peace and stability not only of those States, but also of the entire world community.

More than four years ago, Ukraine exercised its right to self-determination in accordance with the universally accepted principles and norms of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act. The will of the Ukrainian people to establish an independent Ukrainian State was accorded the highest form of legitimacy through the results of the nationwide referendum held on 1 December 1991. Almost 92 per cent of the population voted for Ukraine's independence.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is authorized to state that the adoption by the State Duma of the Russian Federation of the above resolution entails no legal consequences for Ukraine, in that it is a domestic instrument of the Russian Federation and cannot have extraterritorial jurisdiction. Moreover, implementation of the resolution will in fact mean the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the Commonwealth of Independent States with all the unpredictable consequences to which that might lead.

Ukraine, as a founder member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, has from the very beginning of that institution's existence pursued a policy of closer and broader equitable and mutually advantageous cooperation within the Commonwealth, and takes it that the modalities of its participation, as well as

its status within the Commonwealth of Independent States, are determined by the legislative instruments adopted by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on ratifying the Agreement establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States and by the associated reservations. Ukraine will continue in the future to proceed on the understanding that the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States made possible to maintain under new historical circumstances the close and multifaceted links that existed between the Republics of the former Soviet Union and to prevent the emergence on the territory of the former USSR of dangerous trends which could lead to general instability and serious conflicts.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine cannot but draw attention to the fact that, against a background of advancing processes of the strengthening and deepening of bilateral and multilateral relations within the Commonwealth of Independent States, certain political forces in individual States members of that Commonwealth are taking steps that could make the situation in the Commonwealth of Independent States much more complicated. The above-mentioned decision by the State Duma of the Russian Federation may be viewed in precisely this light.

Kiev, 15 March 1996

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1996/209
21 March 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its sixty-third session on the dispute between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on the one hand, and the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, on the other.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed A. AZWAI
Permanent Representative

96-06938 (E) 210396 210396 220396

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Annex

[Original: English]

CM/Draft/Res.28 (LXIII) Rev.1

Draft resolution on the dispute between the Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Sixty-third Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 26 to 28 February 1996,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the crisis as contained in document CM/1914 (LXIII),

Having heard the statement of the leader of delegation of the Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Having listened to the Chairman of the OAU Ministerial Committee on the dispute:

1. Reaffirms its solidarity with the Great Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and commends its efforts and numerous initiatives taken in the search of solution to the crisis;

2. Deplores the maintenance of sanctions against Libya despite that country's flexibility and efforts in meeting the conditions set by the United Nations Security Council for lifting the sanctions;

3. Commends the Ministerial Committee on the dispute for the efforts deployed towards the peaceful resolution of the crisis;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to contact his counterpart in the League of Arab States with a view to organizing a joint meeting of the OAU Ministerial Committee of Five on Libya and the Arab League Committee of Seven on Libya to afford both Committees the opportunity to exchange information and adopt a common strategy that would lead to the peaceful and quick resolution of the crisis;

5. Further requests the Secretary-General to present a report to its sixty-fourth session on the matter.

UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1996/210
21 March 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1035 (1995)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present progress report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1035 (1995) of 21 December 1995, by which the Council authorized the establishment of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in accordance with annex 11 to the General Framework Agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina negotiated at Dayton, Ohio, and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (hereinafter referred to as "the Peace Agreement"), together with a civilian mission as proposed in my report of 13 December 1995 (S/1995/1031). In my report of 6 February 1996 (S/1996/83), I noted that a number of steps were under way for the early establishment of the mission, which would be known as the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).

II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

2. My Special Representative and UNMIBH Chief of Mission, Mr. Iqbal Riza, arrived in Sarajevo on 6 February 1996. A major portion of his time since then has been devoted to the activation of the Mission and arranging effective coordination with the High Representative and the Implementation Force (IFOR). Together with the IPTF Commissioner, Mr. Peter FitzGerald, he has also given the highest priority, in coordination with the High Representative and IFOR, to the complex process of the transfer of authority from the Republika Srpska to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in designated suburbs of Sarajevo. My Special Representative has also initiated steps for the coordination of the activities of those elements of the United Nations system which are active on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3. The transfer of authority from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to IFOR resulted in the transfer to IFOR of most of UNPROFOR's infrastructure, equipment and assets in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been largely provided by the military battalions. As a result, following the termination of UNPROFOR's mandate on 20 December 1995, a major part of its infrastructure and assets was no longer available to the United Nations. The

establishment of UNMIBH has therefore required the re-activation of the few United Nations-owned resources remaining from UNPROFOR and the support of the former United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF) headquarters in Zagreb, now designated the Transition Office in the Former Yugoslavia. It is expected that UNMIBH will be fully operational in the second half of April.

4. Over the last six weeks, UNMIBH's headquarters in Sarajevo has been located in war-damaged premises which are being repaired prior to full occupation. Staff recruitment is proceeding simultaneously with the reactivation of regional offices in Sarajevo, Tuzla and Banja Luka, along with several district offices. The other district offices will be established in the coming weeks. IPTF and civil affairs staff are being co-located in most places. The communications system is being rehabilitated. As regards transportation, vehicles have been transferred from Zagreb. All administrative, logistics and other measures necessary to activate UNMIBH are being taken under provisional financial arrangements, pending the review by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions of the budget proposed for the Mission, and its approval by the General Assembly.

International Police Task Force

5. In December 1995, I approached 53 Member States to seek the 1,721 civilian police officers authorized for the International Police Task Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although a majority agreed to provide approximately 2,000 police officers, only a few countries have been in a position to respond quickly to my request and to provide police personnel for immediate deployment. Because many Member States were unable to make police officers immediately available, deployment of the Task Force was delayed: only 400 police officers, including officers redeployed from UNPF, could therefore be deployed during January and February 1996. Over two thirds of the monitors provided were deployed in Sarajevo to supervise the transfer of police authority to the Federation. It is important to recognize that deployment of police officers to United Nations missions depends on how swiftly Member States can release them from ordinary duty in their home countries and provide them with the necessary information on the relevant United Nations peace-keeping mandate. In the case of UNMIBH, it was only when new police officers were provided by Member States that the deployment process started to accelerate. To date, 650 officers have been deployed, 542 are scheduled for deployment before 10 April 1996 and 529 are planned for deployment before the end of April.

6. The IPTF Commissioner, after surveying operational conditions and requirements on the ground, is reviewing the proposed deployment plan for the Task Force outlined in paragraph 24 of my report of 13 December 1995 (S/1995/1031). The Commissioner is of the view that it is operationally unnecessary, administratively complicated and therefore not advisable to deploy teams to each of the 109 municipalities, many of which are close enough to be monitored effectively from one central location. As a result, the Task Force will need to deploy only to some 50 to 60 locations, with larger concentrations of monitors which will allow greater flexibility and mobility in operations in their respective areas of responsibility. I shall in due course inform the Council of the final deployment plan.

7. One of the major problems encountered in the deployment of the Task Force has been the availability and professional suitability of police personnel offered by Member States. The difficulties encountered in UNMIBH have been especially acute owing, perhaps, to the combination of the large number of officers required and the urgency of their deployment in the very tense conditions prevailing in the Sarajevo suburbs. Although the minimum qualifications required - eight years' policing experience, ability to communicate in English and driving skills - have been specified to Governments, the number of those who failed to meet the criteria and to pass the required elementary tests upon arrival in the theatre has risen to alarming levels. In some cases, the majority of a contingent has failed in one or more tests, with the result that a large number of prospective monitors has had to be repatriated at the expense of the Government concerned. Precious time has been lost when deployment was urgently required, and the search for suitable replacements has caused further delay in the full deployment of the Task Force.

8. As at 15 March 1996, a total of 67 monitors have been repatriated - 50 for not meeting the language criteria and 17 for not passing the driving tests. To cope with this problem, the Department of Peace-keeping Operations has dispatched a police selection assistance team to a group of countries to conduct in-country tests prior to the contingents' travel. This, inevitably, has involved additional and avoidable expenditures. I should like to take this opportunity to appeal to contributing Governments to ensure that properly qualified personnel are provided for United Nations operations.

Civil affairs

9. It is my intention to replicate in UNMIBH the utility and effectiveness of the civil affairs component of UNPROFOR. As at 15 March UNMIBH had filled 30 of the 49 civil affairs posts proposed; the remaining posts are in the process of being filled. Mostly co-deployed with IPTF, civil affairs officers will support their civil police colleagues and will provide their good offices for resolving problems among the parties on the ground. In coordination with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), they will monitor population movements and assess their political implications. Civil affairs officers will also work in coordination with IFOR civil-military cooperation officers and liaise with other international organizations in the field. They will monitor political events, developments and trends and prepare assessments for UNMIBH headquarters. Their assessments will be shared with the High Representative, who anticipates establishing only a few regional offices, and who will rely on UNMIBH for reporting on the situation in both the Federation and the Republika Srpska.

Mine Action Centre

10. An estimated 3 million land-mines lie scattered throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, mostly along former confrontation lines. Several Governments and international organizations have expressed a strong interest in assisting in mine clearance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some have already committed funds to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations

Children's Fund (UNICEF) and a number of non-governmental organizations are either preparing, or have already started, mine awareness programmes.

11. At a meeting in Brussels on 16 February 1996, chaired by the Office of the High Representative and with the participation of the United Nations, the European Commission, the United States Government, IFOR, the World Bank, UNHCR and ICRC, it was recommended that a body be established to function as a clearing-house for policy matters and priorities related to mine clearance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Participants would include the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Government of the Republika Srpska, and the participants in the Brussels meeting. The first meeting of a Mine Clearance Policy Group, under the Joint Civilian Commission, was convened in Sarajevo on 6 March 1996 to establish a framework for coordination and setting of priorities. The Group is chaired by a representative of the High Representative and will provide guidelines to a Mine Action Centre established by the United Nations, following a formal request from the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Centre, with adjunct regional offices, is to provide advice and assistance on all mine-related matters.

12. The first cell of the Mine Action Centre has been established as an integral and distinct unit in UNMIBH, with the following main responsibilities: to advise and assist the Government in formulating and establishing a national mine-clearance programme and a national mine awareness campaign; to coordinate and, where requested, advise on all ongoing mine-clearance and mine awareness activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina; to function as the central repository for land-mine information through the collection and the collating of mine data from all available sources and disseminating this information to all interested parties; and to provide mine awareness education to the public at large as well as international personnel working in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

13. Once the programme, including the establishment of training facilities, is well under way, the Mine Action Centre would transfer its responsibilities to the national authorities. The Governments of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska themselves have a mine-clearance capacity within their military, police and civil defence forces. Limited mine-clearance and mine awareness activities have been carried out by them in the past, and international assistance must be geared to support and enhance this capacity.

14. The World Bank estimates that all mine-clearance activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina require US$70 million in the first 12 months of operations. This includes the operations of the Mine Action Centre, the conduct of a mine survey, the establishment of a field operation with a training component, mine awareness activities, and mine clearance in support of reconstruction. The World Bank has approached donors for support for mine-related activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but has received so far only limited response. This situation may improve following a World Bank-sponsored donors' conference which was held in Sarajevo on 16 and 17 March and at which funding for mine clearance was also discussed. With a number of organizations and Governments involved in the planning and execution of mine-related activities, coordination among all these parties is of the utmost importance to ensure a coherent approach and to avoid duplication of efforts.

III. COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS

15. The complexity of the arrangements under the Peace Agreement and the requirement to deal with three authorities - the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska - necessitate close and effective coordination between the numerous international organizations involved. UNMIBH is required to participate in frequent coordination meetings, in particular with the High Representative and IFOR, to whom the Peace Agreement assigns the leading political and military roles. Coordination is also required with UNHCR, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), ICRC, the World Bank, specialized agencies and other organizations with programmes on the ground, including non-governmental organizations. Currently, an inter-agency mission led by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is in Bosnia and Herzegovina to assess the feasibility of commencing operational activities for development. A UNDP office is soon to be established in Sarajevo. My Special Representative is coordinating closely with the High Representative and IFOR, while maintaining the autonomy of the United Nations Mission and its operational components.

IV. TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY IN THE SUBURBS OF SARAJEVO

16. During the last month UNMIBH, and especially the Task Force, have been predominantly concerned with the transfer of the Bosnian Serb-controlled suburbs of Sarajevo to the authority of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to achieve the reunification of the city under the terms of the Peace Agreement. It was evident from the start that there was considerable fear among Bosnian Serb residents of the suburbs, many of whom had been displaced from other parts of the country in the course of the conflict. They feared that the transfer would result in retribution by returning residents of other ethnic origins, who themselves had been displaced or forcibly evicted or had fled during the war. To minimize the departure of the Bosnian Serb residents of Sarajevo would have required strong and clear reassurances from both the Bosnian Serb leadership and from Federation authorities as well as practical measures by the Federation police who were to take charge of the suburbs.

17. Following a joint statement on 4 February 1996 by the High Representative and IFOR regarding the hand-over of the suburbs to the Federation by 19 March, a joint plan was worked out with the Task Force under which the transfer of authority from the Republika Srpska to the Federation police in the five suburbs would be effected in five phases from 23 February to 19 March. The sequence for transfer was as follows: Vogosca on 23 February; Ilijas on 29 February; Hadzici on 6 March; Ilidza on 12 March; and Grbavica on 19 March. The plan, agreed to by the Federation Government, envisaged strict control and monitoring of Federation police by the Task Force, with IFOR support. The key elements of the plan included an agreed ratio of IPTF to Federation police in the various areas; the issuance of special identity cards for Federation police authorized and cleared by IPTF; a change in the composition of the Federation police in each suburb to reflect the ethnic mix of the population according to the 1991 census; IPTF authorization of Federation police check-points; and requests in advance for searches of houses or private property. These searches were to be monitored by the Task Force. Civilian authority was to be transferred to the Federation

in all suburbs on 20 March, the political aspects being dealt with by the Office of the High Representative.

18. UNMIBH's aims were twofold: first to ensure an orderly transfer by closely monitoring the outgoing and incoming police, and, second, to reassure the Bosnian Serb population through the Task Force's presence, in the hope that a significant number would stay. In the first three suburbs, the first aim was largely attained and there were few complaints against the Federation police who took control, although the relatively small number of Bosnian Serbs who chose to remain have been harassed by returning Bosniacs. IPTF efforts to reassure the population failed, however, as over 90 per cent of the Bosnian Serbs left in a planned but poorly organized exodus. The suburb of Ilidza witnessed serious law and order problems after the hand-over when thousands of Bosniacs from Sarajevo entered the suburb and proceeded to harass and intimidate many of the remaining 3,000 to 4,000 Bosnian Serb residents, robbing and looting their apartments in the process. Despite stricter measures being put in place, including additional Federation officers authorized by the Task Force, conditions in Grbavica deteriorated as Bosnian Serb police abandoned their duties. The Federation authorities and their police, who took control of these suburbs, did little to prevent or halt such lawlessness.

19. There are strong indications that the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale had decided that Bosnian Serbs, including long-time residents of Sarajevo, should not be allowed to remain in those suburbs which were to be transferred to the Federation. An overt and insidious campaign of pressure to induce them to leave was undertaken, with intimidation being employed as necessary. Gangs of youths visited and threatened Bosnian Serb residents who were undecided or wished to stay. Truck convoys were organized to hasten their departure in bitter winter weather, often to pre-determined destinations where provisional housing had been arranged. Arson, looting and harassment were widespread, especially in Ilidza and Grbavica. UNMIBH civil affairs and UNHCR field offices in Ilidza were robbed and subsequently set on fire. In all five suburbs, the economic infrastructure was dismantled and removed before the hand-over dates. Institutions such as hospitals, clinics, schools, water, electricity and gas plants and factories were left completely stripped. Consequently, the restoration of utilities has become a priority for Federation authorities.

20. For its part, the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina did little to encourage the Bosnian Serb residents to stay. The television controlled by the ruling Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which was widely watched in the Bosnian Serb-held suburbs, continued to carry religious and nationalist programming. Virtually no guarantees were given or attempts made to reassure the Bosnian Serb population, apart from some half-hearted statements from government authorities. This is all the more deplorable as some Bosnian Serb leaders in the Sarajevo suburbs had taken great political and personal risks to remain in the city and persuade their constituents to do the same. Many of those who did remain have now started to leave because of intimidation and harassment by Bosniac gangs.

21. During the transfer, the Task Force had very limited resources to work with, because of the delayed availability of police monitors. The Commissioner had only 150 monitors at the start of the transfer, and 350 by the end of the process, to deploy in the five suburbs for 24-hour monitoring and patrols. IPTF

worked closely with IFOR, depending on the latter for support, and joint patrols were conducted in Ilidza and Grbavica. IFOR provided escort to Federation fire-fighting vehicles and personnel to douse fires in the five suburbs, especially in Ilidza and Grbavica. Aside from the aforementioned tasks, IFOR declined to undertake any task it considered would draw it beyond the limits of its mandate into policing or law and order functions.

V. OBSERVATIONS

22. As the Peace Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Security Council assign to the High Representative and the Commander of IFOR the responsibility for supervision of its implementation, I shall comment only in general terms on these aspects.

23. It is evident that the military undertakings under the Agreement have been complied with under the powerful presence of IFOR. Thus a relatively stable military environment has been established for the implementation of the extremely complex political and civilian undertakings contained in the Agreement. However, the two aspects are interconnected, and only when the latter goal is achieved can the implementation of the Peace Agreement be considered successful.

24. The bitterness, fears and hatred created by the past four years of war are the underlying forces that led to the recent exodus of the Bosnian Serb population of Sarajevo. As noted, however, the Bosnian Serb and the Federation authorities bear a great responsibility for this set-back, as they did not show any determination to reassure and persuade the Serb population to stay on. This has resulted in another round of population movements along "ethnic" lines, further separating Bosnian Serbs and Bosniacs, and delivering a telling blow to the multicultural nature of Sarajevo society. There still remains the possibility that a number of the Bosnian Serb Sarajevans, who left and now find themselves in difficult conditions in their new environment, may consider returning to Sarajevo if they feel that conditions there are secure enough. The Federation authorities, however, will have to make greater efforts towards reconciliation if they wish to encourage the reconstitution of a multi-cultural Sarajevo.

25. Meanwhile, the challenge remains to strengthen the links between the two entities to whom the Peace Agreement assigns considerable autonomy and constitutional authority. Here, too, the restoration of some degree of confidence at the political level is essential for them to work together in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is understandable that the restoration of such confidence may be impeded by the deep wounds and distrust left by the conflict at the individual human level as well as by current political calculations. Healing, however, must be encouraged by conciliatory decisions and actions by the leadership of both sides.

26. Within the Federation, persistent strains between the two partners are a major course for concern. A territorial dispute in western Bosnia, disagreement over the status of Sarajevo, frictions between the two police forces and the failure of the parties to implement earlier agreements on economic and political

matters, have all exacerbated existing difficulties. Unless the two communities make determined and sustained efforts to avoid conflict, establish cantons as agreed and strengthen Federation structures, divisive trends will increase. This will not only further weaken the Federation, but will have repercussions on the structure of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

27. It is in the midst of these tensions that UNMIBH and its principal component, the International Police Task Force, are operating. I must stress that Annex 11 to the Peace Agreement envisages the Task Force as an unarmed, monitoring and advisory force. It is on this basis that the Security Council authorized its deployment and contributing Governments have provided personnel. It is not feasible to assign to this unarmed force the task of enforcing law and order in a country awash with weapons, all the more so when it has no legal authority to do so.

28. Finally, I must reiterate that peace cannot be durable unless it is accompanied with justice. Following one of the most bitter wars in Europe since 1945, with unspeakable atrocities against civilians reaching the level of crimes against humanity, those individuals indicted by the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia must be brought to trial. Peace with justice is an overriding goal of the international community, and it is the legal and moral duty of all signatories to the Peace Agreement to assist in its attainment.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/210/Corr.1
22 March 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1035 (1996)

Corrigendum

Paragraph 4

The first two sentences should read

Over the last six weeks, UNMIBH's headquarters in Sarajevo has temporarily been located in premises kindly provided by the High Representative, Mr. Carl Bildt, pending relocation to a more durable headquarters. This will be in a war-damaged building which is being repaired.

96-07101 (E) 220396 230396

UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

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S/1996/211
22 March 1996
ENGLISH
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
Item 154 of the preliminary list*
MEASURES TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 21 March 1996 from the representatives of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a tripartite declaration issued by our three Governments on 21 March 1996 concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992, 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992 and 883 (1993) of 11 November 1993 by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

We should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 154 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hervé LADSOUS
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of France
to the United Nations

(Signed) John WESTON
Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland to the
United Nations

(Signed) Karl F. INDERFURTH
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of the
United States of America
to the United Nations

* A/51/50.

ANNEX

Declaration made on 21 March 1996 by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on the occasion of the twelfth review of sanctions imposed on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by the Security Council in its resolution 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992

The United States, France and the United Kingdom take note once again that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has still not complied with Security Council resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992) and 883 (1993). The three States regret Libyan non-compliance and reaffirm their common determination to have all provisions contained in those resolutions implemented.

They reiterate that, in accordance with those resolutions, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya must commit itself to ceasing all forms of terrorist activity and all assistance to terrorist groups, and regret deeply that, after the step that it had taken by providing the British Government with information on its former ties with the Provisional Irish Republic Army, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has shamefully expressed its satisfaction with the terrorist bombings that recently took place in Israel.

The United States, France and the United Kingdom will carry out an early and thorough review of the implementation of the provisions contained in those resolutions with a view to identifying measures to strengthen the impact of existing sanctions on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya through their full and rigorous application. They intend to report to the Sanctions Committee the conclusions of these consultations where they fall within the framework of the sanctions agreed by the Security Council. They will also urge Member States to tighten enforcement of existing sanctions until the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya complies fully with its obligations.

Stressing that the solution rests with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the three Governments also call on Member States to urge Libyan authorities to comply with their obligations in accordance with the above-mentioned resolutions.

The three States will not accept that those responsible for the two bombings that resulted in the death of 441 innocent victims remain unpunished. They request that, in accordance with the resolutions, those accused of the bombing of flight Pan Am 103 be tried in Scotland or the United States and that satisfactory answers be given rapidly to the many requests by the French judicial authorities on the bombing of flight UTA 772.

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/1996/212
22 March 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN TAJIKISTAN

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1030 (1995) of 14 December 1995, in which the Council requested me to report to it every three months on the progress towards a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict and on the operations of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT).

II. NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE

2. As previously reported (S/1995/1024), the continuous inter-Tajik negotiations under United Nations auspices began in Ashkhabad on 30 November 1995. However, on the previous day, fighting began north-east of Tavildara between government forces at Mienadu and Argankul and opposition forces at Lairon; the latter had been reinforced from Gorniy Badakshan during the preceding months. By 6 December, the government forces had advanced to Lairon. During the same period, opposition fighters carried out frequent attacks against border posts in the Moskovskiy district. UNMOT undertook investigations of its own and arranged investigations by the Joint Commission in both areas. The beginning of the Ashkhabad talks was overshadowed by this fighting and the first working plenary session was held only on 7 December.

3. On 13 December 1995, the two delegations adopted a joint declaration (see annex I to the present report), in which they deplored the serious violations of the Tehran agreement (S/1994/1102, annex I) and pledged to respect it in the future. The fighting nevertheless continued. On 14 and 15 December, my Special Envoy for Tajikistan, Mr. Ramiro Píriz-Ballón, visited Moscow for consultations with Mr. Ryurikov, Foreign Policy Assistant to President Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin, and Mr. Chernishov, Deputy Foreign Minister. On 17 December, an UNMOT team was stationed in Tavildara. After joint efforts by the Government of the Russian Federation and the United Nations, the fighting was halted and the situation gradually calmed down.

4. Following this restoration of a fragile cease-fire, the two delegations in Ashkhabad began consideration of the main political issues included in the

protocol of 17 August 1995 on the fundamental principles for establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan (S/1995/720). The delegation of the Government, led by Mr. Makhmadsaid Ubaidulloev, First Deputy Prime Minister, presented a position paper in which the establishment of a consultative forum of the peoples of Tajikistan was the main proposal. The proposed forum would be convened at Dushanbe in May/June 1996 on the basis of equal representation by the Government and the opposition. It would consider the further improvement of political, economic and social reforms and would have consultative status; its recommendations would be adopted by consensus. The Government's proposals touched only in general terms on other important political issues included in the 17 August protocol. The opposition delegation rejected the concept of the consultative forum proposed by the Government, alleging that Dushanbe wanted to avoid the consideration of other political issues by concentrating exclusively on this issue.

5. The delegation of the United Tajik Opposition, led by Mr. Akbar Turajonzodah, First Deputy Chairman of the Islamic Revival Movement of Tajikistan, presented elaborate proposals on political and military issues, as well as guarantees for the implementation of a general peace agreement. The core of the opposition's proposals was the establishment of a council of national reconciliation for a transitional period of up to two years. The council would consist of 25 representatives from each of the two sides and 10 representatives of ethnic minorities; it would be chaired by a representative of the opposition. The council would replace the Parliament (Majlis-i Olii), which would be disbanded. The current President would continue his functions and, together with the council, would form a new Government. The council would prepare new parliamentary elections and would cease to exist once the new parliament was elected. New presidential elections would be held six months later. These proposals were rejected by the government delegation as unconstitutional and as having the potential to destabilize the country once again and provoke a new cycle of civil war. On 22 December 1995, the delegation of the opposition presented its own proposals on the establishment of the consultative forum of the Tajik peoples. However, they were not accepted by the other side.

6. This was the first time that the two sides discussed the central political issues, including possible ways of power-sharing. However, they were not able to reach agreements on them because of the wide gap between their approaches.

7. On 22 December 1995, during the last plenary session of this first phase of the Ashkhabad talks, the delegation of the opposition unexpectedly declared that it would not consider it appropriate to renew the continuous round of inter-Tajik talks unless the heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States, at their scheduled summit in mid-January 1996, clearly defined their position with regard to a political settlement in Tajikistan and supported that position with concrete acts. This condition created a serious obstacle to the resumption of the talks, which had been scheduled for 15 January 1996. Following concerted efforts by my Special Envoy and interested Governments, particularly that of Turkmenistan, the talks resumed on 26 January.

8. The beginning of the second phase, which lasted from 26 January to 18 February 1996, was again adversely affected by an escalation of violence and

instability in Tajikistan. On 27 January, armed insurrections against the Government took place at Kurgan-Tyube, Tursunzade and Khojand. In Khojand the insurrection subsided soon afterwards, but a potentially dangerous situation developed in Tursunzade, where the group involved took members of the Tajik border guards hostage, and in Kurgan-Tyube, where the First Brigade of the Tajik army took control of the city and subsequently deployed towards Dushanbe, coming at one point within 15 kilometres of the capital. The insurgents made a number of demands, including the replacement of senior government officials, the partition of Khatlon province and an amnesty for themselves. The situation was defused without bloodshed after the Government complied with some of these demands, including the replacement of some officials and the amnesty. The insurgents in Tursunzade laid down their arms and the First Brigade returned to its barracks.

9. While the country was preoccupied with this crisis, fighting resumed in the Tavildara sector on 29 January. The opposition inflicted heavy losses on the government forces and took a large number of prisoners. Until mid-February the opposition forces advanced approximately 30 kilometres along the Obikhingou valley towards Tavildara, reaching a new line at Sayod, about 18 kilometres north-east of Tavildara. On 11 February, at Sicharog (near Komsomolabad), the opposition took control of a stretch of the road between Dushanbe and Tavildara/Garm, thereby impeding the resupply of government forces at Tavildara. In the Garm area, the situation was also very tense, despite a meeting arranged by UNMOT on 12 February between the Joint Commission and the chief opposition commander in the area. At Vanj the opposition, which already exercised military control in the valley, seized the government offices and forced the officials to resign. After intervention by UNMOT, the offices were vacated except for the internal security office, whose chief had refused to resign. There were also exchanges of fire between opposition fighters and the Russian border forces along the border with Afghanistan, between Panj and Shuroabad.

10. During the second phase of the Ashkhabad talks, the delegation of the Government was led by Mr. Talbak Nazarov, Minister for Foreign Affairs. At the beginning of the round, he presented a position paper which included proposals to hold a special session of the Parliament to consider the inter-Tajik negotiations; to discuss the modalities of the integration of opposition representatives into the Government and local executive committees; and to consider ways for integration of opposition military units into the government forces. In addition, the government delegation accepted the opposition's proposals of 22 December 1995 on the establishment of the consultative forum of the Tajik peoples.

11. Given this conciliatory and flexible position, it was possible to prepare a draft agreement on convening the consultative forum. However, the two sides disagreed on the timing of its convening. The government delegation suggested that it could meet periodically, before and after the signing of the general peace agreement. The opposition delegation changed its previous position, as formulated in the proposal of 22 December, and insisted that the forum be convened only after the signing of the general peace agreement and after the establishment of the council of national reconciliation. However, the two sides agreed that the draft agreement would remain open for signature after the problem of timing was resolved.

12. As regards the modalities for the special session of the Parliament, the government delegation agreed with the proposal of the opposition that its proceedings should be fully publicized over radio and television and in other mass media. The agreement on holding the special session was included in the Ashkhabad Declaration (S/1996/129, annex).

13. The opposition delegation did not present new proposals during the second phase of the talks and reiterated its positions on political issues as formulated during the first phase of the talks. It stressed that the establishment of the council on national reconciliation was the only viable option to resolve the crisis and avoided discussing the participation of its representatives in the Government.

14. In view of the continued differences between the positions of the two Tajik sides, my Special Envoy presented compromise proposals on the political and military clusters of issues contained in the 17 August protocol (see annex II). The government delegation accepted the proposals as the basis for further negotiations. The opposition delegation accepted the proposals contained in paragraph 2 and made some clarifications of points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 but completely rejected point (c). This dealt with granting an amnesty for the opposition leaders, who stated that the Government, which they did not recognize, was not in a position to pardon them. The opposition delegation also disagreed with the proposals contained in paragraph 3, which outlined ways to achieve power-sharing. The parties agreed to renew the talks in Ashkhabad at a time to be determined by my Special Envoy.

15. At Ashkhabad, the two sides also discussed the extension of the cease-fire agreement. The government delegation accepted my Special Envoy's proposal that it be extended for a further six months. The opposition delegation agreed to a three-month extension, provided the Government accepted three conditions: an exchange of prisoners of war and detainees (150 on each side) in one month; respect for the frontline in the Tavildara sector as it was on 17 February; and respect for the status quo established in the Vanj district as of 17 February. The government delegation was prepared to discuss the exchange of prisoners of war and detainees but rejected the other two conditions. The talks ended on 18 February without agreement on an extension of the cease-fire.

16. As the United Nations and others, notably the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation, pursued efforts to establish agreement on extension of the cease-fire, a serious incident occurred in Dushanbe on 24 February, when Mr. Zafar Rakhmonov, the opposition co-chairman of the Joint Commission, was reported to have been kidnapped. At the time, he was unprotected, as the security detail provided by the Government for the opposition members of the Joint Commission under the relevant protocol had been withdrawn on 12 February and, despite repeated démarches by UNMOT, had not been replaced. No information has been received, so far, on Mr. Rakhmonov's fate or the identity of the kidnappers. The other four opposition members of the Joint Commission in Dushanbe have since left Tajikistan on security grounds.

17. On 25 February, I received a letter from Mr. Abdullo Nuri, leader of the United Tajik Opposition, in which he expressed readiness to extend the Tehran agreement for another three months, provided the Government agreed with the

proposals initiated by the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran. On 26 February, I also received a letter from President Emomali Rakhmonov, in which he stated the unconditional commitment of his Government to the extension of the cease-fire agreement for the duration of the inter-Tajik negotiations. The Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Velayati, during an official visit to Dushanbe on 28 and 29 February, discussed the possibility of extending the cease-fire agreement with President Rakhmonov. However, agreement on the extension was not finalized.

18. On 28 February, the Speaker of the Tajik Parliament, Mr. Safarli Rajabov, in a letter addressed to my Deputy Special Envoy, Mr. Darko Silovic, informed him of the decision of the Presidium of the Parliament to hold a special session of Parliament on 11 March 1996, in accordance with the Ashkhabad declaration. He requested the United Nations to facilitate the participation of the opposition leaders in the session. The Foreign Ministry of Tajikistan, in a letter of 5 March addressed to UNMOT, reconfirmed guarantees concerning the security and immunity of the opposition delegation.

19. On the same day, the government forces began artillery and air attacks against the positions of the opposition in the Tavildara sector. The opposition's roadblock between Dushanbe and Tavildara/Garm at Sicharog was forcibly removed after heavy fighting. At the time of reporting, the situation was unchanged although the fighting had diminished, apparently because of harsh weather.

20. In view of the seriousness of the problems related to the extension of the cease-fire agreement and the participation of the opposition delegation in the special session, I asked Mr. Ismat Kittani, my Special Adviser and, formerly, my Special Envoy for Tajikistan, to visit Tehran and Dushanbe in an effort to resolve these two issues, Mr. Píriz-Ballón having by this time returned to his country's service.

21. On 9 and 10 March 1996, Mr. Kittani had intensive talks in Tehran with Mr. Nuri, leader of the United Tajik Opposition, as well as consulting Mr. Vaezi, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a result, and thanks to the good offices of Iranian officials, the Tajik opposition agreed to extend the cease-fire agreement for another three months until 26 May 1996 and confirmed this in a letter of 9 March 1996 addressed by Mr. Nuri to Mr. Kittani. Regrettably, however, the Tajik opposition leaders decided not to participate in the special session of the Parliament. Security concerns were given as the main reason for their decision. But Mr. Nuri has unequivocally indicated the intention of the opposition to continue the inter-Tajik political dialogue and has expressed the will to resume negotiations as soon as possible.

22. On 11 March 1996, at its special session, the Tajik Parliament considered the issue of the inter-Tajik negotiations and problems related to national reconciliation. Mr. Nazarov made a report on the history and current status of the negotiations. He concluded in his report that the conflict could be resolved only through political dialogue, although he emphasized that compromise should be based on the provisions of the current Constitution. An absolute majority of the speakers, including President Rakhmonov, strongly supported the

continuation of the inter-Tajik negotiations as the only way out of the current crisis. They expressed regret over the absence of the opposition leaders. Mr. Kittani addressed the session, highlighting the need for both parties to strictly observe the provisions of the cease-fire agreement and to make substantive progress in resolving the key political problems. The proceedings of the session were broadcast in full by the national radio and television.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION OF OBSERVERS IN TAJIKISTAN

23. UNMOT's activities during this period were largely determined by the events described above. It carried out 19 investigations, 4 of which were conducted with the Joint Commission and 15 independently. In 3 cases the available evidence was not sufficient to substantiate or disprove the allegations; in 10 cases violations were clearly established. Six were committed by the Government and four by the opposition. In 3 cases investigations continue.

24. During the periods of high tension in February and March, UNMOT's observers were twice harassed and their freedom of movement was restricted by government personnel at Tavildara and on the Garm-Dushanbe road. Similarly, opposition fighters in the Tavildara sector stopped and threatened a team of United Nations observers on 28 February. All these incidents were protested.

25. In accordance with the protocol of the Joint Commission (S/1994/1253), the Tajik Government is responsible for providing logistic support for the Commission. This has remained inadequate. The United Nations trust fund, which has been used for the same purpose, is now almost depleted. Similarly, UNMOT has not yet been provided with sufficient office space, as stipulated in the status-of-mission agreement between Tajikistan and the United Nations.

26. With the establishment of a team at Tavildara, UNMOT now maintains eight teams in the field and its strength has been increased to 45. However, it has not been possible to complete arrangements for the liaison office at Taloqan, in northern Afghanistan. The Afghan authorities have agreed to extend to UNMOT the necessary privileges and immunities but have so far objected to the stationing of military personnel. During the fighting in March, the peace-keeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States provided helicopter support to UNMOT for the rotation and resupply of the teams at Tavildara and Garm.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

27. The beginning of the continuous inter-Tajik negotiations at Ashkhabad raised hopes for substantive progress towards a general peace agreement, in accordance with the provisions of the 17 August 1995 protocol. However, very little progress was achieved, despite the active encouragement given to the parties by interested countries and the excellent conditions provided for the negotiations by the Turkmen Government. The only promising development in the talks was the agreement on holding the special session of the Tajik Parliament with the participation of the opposition leaders. Unfortunately, this session,

which had the potential of becoming a turning-point in the process of national reconciliation, was not attended by the opposition delegation.

28. I have taken note of the recent statements of President Rakhmonov and Mr. Nuri on their readiness to continue their direct dialogue and to resume the inter-Tajik negotiations in the near future. I welcome these intentions and hope that contacts between the two parties at the highest level will give the necessary impetus to the negotiating process. I also hope that the time before the resumption of the inter-Tajik negotiations will be used by both parties for promoting the atmosphere of mutual trust that is essential for the continuation of productive negotiations.

29. In the meantime, I am seriously concerned about the continued serious violations of the cease-fire by both sides and the grave difficulties we have encountered recently with the extension of the Tehran agreement. I appeal, therefore, to the Tajik parties to comply strictly with the obligations assumed under the cease-fire agreement. I also appeal to the leadership of the opposition to consider positively the proposal of the Government regarding the extension of the cease-fire agreement for the whole duration of the inter-Tajik negotiations. This would allow the parties to concentrate on the core political and other problems included in the 17 August 1995 Protocol and to avoid losing precious time in frustrating negotiations on extensions of the cease-fire.

30. I expect the Government to investigate fully the abduction of Mr. Zafar Rakhmonov and to provide all the security guarantees necessary for the safe and effective functioning of the Joint Commission. At the same time, I hope that the opposition members of the Joint Commission will return to Dushanbe and resume their important functions as soon as possible.

31. I am receiving alarming information on a deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Tajikistan, particularly in the areas affected by the continued military confrontation. Over 600,000 people are at present in need of emergency food assistance. Their plight is compounded by severe energy shortages and a rapid increase of health-related problems. Continued donor support is urgently required to respond to this current emergency.

32. I take this opportunity to inform members of the Security Council that Mr. Píriz-Ballón has assumed an important post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay and cannot continue to perform the functions of my Special Envoy for Tajikistan. I should also like to express my deep appreciation for his dedication and for his substantive contribution to the United Nations peacemaking efforts in Tajikistan. I will shortly inform the Council of the arrangements I shall make to replace Mr. Píriz-Ballón.

Annex I

Joint declaration signed at Ashkhabad on 13 December 1995

The delegations of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition, expressing their interest in achieving concrete results in the course of the continuous round of inter-Tajik talks in Ashkhabad, in accordance with the protocol on the fundamental principles for establishing peace and national accord, condemn the serious violations of the Tehran agreement that have been committed from 18 August 1995 up to the present time.

The parties entrust the Joint Commission, with the participation of United Nations military observers, to carry out an investigation of the most recent events in the Tavildara and Shuroabad areas.

The parties undertake henceforth to respect and observe unconditionally the provisions of the aforesaid Agreement and request the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) to redeploy its posts to these districts from other areas with a view to conducting observations and obtaining reliable information.

(Signed) M. UBAIDULLOEV
Head of the delegation of
the Government of the Republic
of Tajikistan

(Signed) A. TURAJONZODAH
Head of the delegation of
the United Tajik Opposition

(Signed) R. PÍRIZ-BALLÓN
Special Envoy of the
Secretary-General of the
United Nations

Annex II

[Original: Russian]

Proposals submitted by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Tajikistan on 6 February 1996 at Ashkhabad regarding the groups of political and military problems contained in the protocol of 17 August 1995

In accordance with the protocol of 17 August 1995 on the fundamental principles for establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan, and with a view to normalizing and democratizing political life in the country and putting an effective end to the military confrontation, I propose that the delegations of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition should settle the following interconnected questions:

1. Legalizing the activities of all political parties and movements.

In order to reach the target that has been set, the following related questions should be settled:

(a) Making the necessary amendments to the Law of 12 December 1990 on public associations in the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, or adopting a new law on the subject;

(b) Ensuring legal and other guarantees for the free functioning of all political parties and movements, as well as their mass media;

(c) Discontinuing criminal proceedings against opposition figures in connection with the civil war and the subsequent military and political confrontation.

2. In parallel with and at the same time as addressing the tasks enumerated in paragraph 1 of this document, ensuring the transformation of military-political opposition movements into political parties.

To this end, the following measures should be implemented:

(a) Disbanding, disarming and reintegrating armed opposition formations into government armed forces or the country's civilian sector;

(b) Reforming governmental power structures to take account of regional criteria, including the recertification of all personnel and the dismissal of persons lacking professional training, who should be reintegrated into the civilian sector;

(c) Disarmament of the civilian population.

3. Carrying out the tasks indicated above will create conditions for the holding of free, fair, democratic and internationally monitored elections to the country's parliament and local government bodies. These elections will be held on the basis of a new law on elections or an amended and amplified version of the existing law. The Government and local executive bodies will be formed on the basis of the results of the elections. The opportunity for representatives of all political parties and movements to participate in the power structures will therefore be guaranteed on the basis of democratic principles.

4. While agreements are being elaborated on paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this document, with the participation of experts from the United Nations, other international organizations and States acting as observers at inter-Tajik negotiations, detailed mechanisms and guarantees will be agreed to ensure the precise and conscientious fulfilment by both sides of the agreements that have been reached.

(Signed) Ramiro PÍRIZ-BALLÓN
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations



Map No. 3887 Rev.6 UNITED NATIONS
March 1996

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Cartographic Section

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/213
22 March 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1035 (1995) of 21 December 1995 and my report S/1995/1031 of 13 December 1995 concerning the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).

In the context of assessing the transportation needs of UNMIBH, it has been determined that the least costly option would be to deploy military rather than civilian helicopters in order to meet the air transport requirements of the Mission. Since the deployment of military personnel requires authorization by the Security Council, I would appreciate the concurrence of the members of the Council to the deployment of UNMIBH of two military helicopters and the necessary operating and support personnel from the Ukraine.

I should be grateful if you could bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/214
22 March 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 MARCH 1996 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 19 March 1996 (S/1996/213) concerning your proposal to deploy to the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) two military helicopters and the necessary operating and support personnel from Ukraine has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They concur with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Legwaila Joseph LEGWAILA
President of the Security Council

96-07113 (E) 220396 230396

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/215
22 March 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 MARCH 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 22 March 1996, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I would appreciate your bringing it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Annex

Letter dated 22 March 1996 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 1031 (1995), I attach the fourth report on the operations of the Implementation Force (IFOR). I would appreciate your making this report available to the United Nations Security Council.

On 19 March (D+90), we passed another deadline in the implementation of annex 1-A to the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In general, I am satisfied with the cooperation and compliance of the parties in implementing the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. That said, there are some areas of serious concern, such as the continued presence of foreign forces and detention of prisoners of war in violation of the Peace Agreement, and the violence associated with the transfer of Sarajevo suburbs to Federation control. There is no doubt that there will be further challenges to meet as we move towards the next major deadline at D+120.

IFOR is now working with the parties towards the D+120 requirement to withdraw all heavy weapons and forces to designated areas and to demobilize those which cannot be accommodated there. IFOR is also working to extend freedom of movement for the civilian population and to consolidate the secure environment within which the overall implementation of the Peace Agreement can proceed.

IFOR has accomplished much in the last 90 days. In future, I anticipate that the focus of attention will shift increasingly from the military to the civil aspects of peace implementation. IFOR will continue to assist the High Representative and the civil agencies in whatever ways it can, consistent with its primary mission. We recognize that IFOR cannot succeed on its own. Peace will only endure in Bosnia and Herzegovina if both the military and the civil aspects of implementation succeed in concert.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

Appendix

Fourth report to the United Nations Security Council on IFOR operations

The present report covers the period between the last report (S/1996/131, annex), dated 26 February 1996, and 22 March 1996.

Deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR)

1. The deployment of the NATO element of the multinational implementation force (IFOR) is complete. IFOR comprises approximately 49,000 personnel from all the NATO countries and 6,500 from non-NATO contributors. It will be further strengthened as forces from other non-NATO contributors transfer under IFOR control. IFOR is fully capable of carrying out its primary task of implementing the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. This includes monitoring of compliance by the parties with their obligations under annex 1-A, including respect for the new zone of separation (established along the inter-entity boundary line at D+90 (19 March). In addition, IFOR is helping to ensure overall freedom of movement, providing a secure environment for the work of the various organizations involved in implementing the civil aspects of the Peace Agreement, and assisting those organizations, on a case-by-base basis, from available resources without detriment to IFOR's primary mission.

2. IFOR air assets continue to provide a robust capability to secure the air space, defend and support IFOR ground forces and monitor compliance. They also provide a capability for close air support to the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). The maritime assets currently deployed both in support of IFOR and for Operation Sharp Guard continue to provide surveillance, a presence to seaward of the coast and, embarked, the theatre reserve.

3. Force contributions from 12 non-Nato countries are now operational in theatre and it is expected that troops from two additional non-NATO countries will be in theatre and operational next month. Offers from other non-NATO countries are still pending. It is expected that a total of around 10,000 troops will be provided by non-NATO contributors to IFOR.

Risk assessment

4. Rogue or extremist elements and the continued risk posed by foreign forces remain of concern to IFOR. Occasional sniping and shooting incidents, although declining, have also continued although these are assessed as stemming mainly from disaffected elements of the parties. IFOR's robust capabilities and rules of engagement enable it to defend itself effectively and to provide protection for others involved in implementing the Peace Agreement.

5. The very large number of mines that are scattered throughout Bosnia remain the most significant danger to IFOR personnel and others. Incidents continue to cause casualties to IFOR and local people and, notwithstanding the efforts of the parties to mark and clear the minefields, under IFOR supervision,

the problem remains very great. The inaccuracy of the information on known minefields, the quantity of mines, poor weather until now and the lack of proper mine marking and clearing equipment have significantly impaired the clearance of mines by the parties. The threat posed by mines to the civilian population is likely to increase as improving weather leads to more movement of the population.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

6. At a meeting with Contact Group countries at Geneva on 17 and 18 March, all parties reaffirmed their commitment to the terms of the Peace Agreement. Progress on compliance with annex 1-A to the Peace Agreement has been generally evident across the board and the parties are continuing to work towards meeting their responsibilities. In particular:

- The cease-fire continues to hold and the parties remain generally in compliance with the cessation of hostilities.

- All parties have been generally in compliance with the requirements in the zones of separation (ZOS) and areas of transfer, including the new ZOS established along the inter-entity boundary line at D+90 (19 March). Verification of compliance with the new ZOS continues, particularly as the removal of some forces from the new ZOS within Sarajevo occurred only as the deadline passed following a demonstration of IFOR resolve. Minor violations of the ZOS by all parties have continued to occur. These generally involve small groups of soldiers patrolling and sometimes manning positions within the ZOS. When challenged by IFOR they have complied and left the area.

- IFOR has required air defence systems to be secured in designated sites by D+90. While there has been major movement to achieve this, it is assessed that full compliance has yet to be achieved.

- The Peace Agreement requires the withdrawal of all foreign forces, whether advisers, trainers, volunteers or freedom fighters. Full compliance has not been achieved and the continued presence of foreign forces in contravention of the Peace Agreement is a continuing cause for serious concern.

- All parties are still holding prisoners of war in violation of the Peace Agreement. Following the negotiations at Geneva, it is imperative that the final release of prisoners by all parties be now achieved.

- Restrictions on the freedom of movement for civilians, refugees and displaced persons continue to cause concern. This has been particulary so along the inter-entity boundary line, where undeclared control points have been established by the parties. Elsewhere, restrictions are frequently caused more by fear than by physical obstruction. IFOR has warned all parties that only police functions supervised by the International Police Task Force will be permitted

and that IFOR will require unauthorized check-points along the inter-ethnic boundary line to be dismantled.

- In some areas, especially within Sarajevo, the introduction and ethnic balance of some police forces have been raising tension and risking confrontation.

- Although the phased transition of the Sarajevo suburbs to Federation control, due by D+90, has been achieved on time, the looting, arson and beatings which accompanied it have been a cause for considerable concern and could have serious repercussions in other areas. IFOR has worked closely with the High Representative, the Task Force, the Federation police and local leaders in trying to maintain control and calm within these areas. This has included the heavy patrolling of affected areas and the protection of fire-fighters and essential installations.

7. IFOR will continue to execute its mission in an evenhanded manner. Following the Rome Summit on 17 and 18 February, contact has been restored with all parties and the Joint Military Commission and its supporting structure of military commissions are now operating effectively. Meetings between the parties and IFOR Commanders continue to focus on the military aspects of compliance and to provide a forum within which to address such current issues as Sarajevo and freedom of movement.

Cooperation with the High Representative and international organizations

8. Recognizing that the civil aspects of the Peace Agreement are crucial to its success, IFOR is assisting the High Representative and the international organizations involved in implementing the civil aspects of the Peace Agreement as far as its principal tasks, as defined in the Peace Agreement, and available resources allow. The IFOR civil/military cooperation process involves close liaison and cooperation with international organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). IFOR is already engaged in supporting a number of reconstruction projects, mainly in areas of importance for the conduct of its mission. It is also in close contact with the staff of the High Representative and OSCE representatives about how best it can provide support to the elections required by the Peace Agreement. General support to all civil agencies includes the exchange of information and security advice and, in emergency, the provision of medical and repair facilities, fuel, accommodation and food, based on retrospective repayment arrangements.

9. Specific support is being provided, where possible, to the High Representative and his staff, including assistance with transportation, logistics, communications, security and administration. Media communications facilities have also been offered to the High Representative to enhance his ability to communicate with the population. IFOR is represented on and helping to extend the High Representative's Joint Civil Commission structure throughout the country.

10. IFOR continues to support, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, the efforts of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to bring persons indicted by the Tribunal to justice. A recent example is the transport and escort protection given to the Tribunal team investigating a mass grave site in the Prijedor Obstina area. IFOR is also undertaking air reconnaissance and area ground surveillance of suspected mass grave sites and will report any tampering which it detects to the Tribunal.

11. IFOR is supporting the International Police Task Force by providing quick reaction forces and other forms of assistance. As mentioned in the last report, it is essential, in the interest of ensuring stability, for the Task Force to reach full strength as soon as possible.